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a b s t r a c t 
The growing proportion of UK bank lending to the financial sector reached a peak in 2007 
just before the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This marks a trend in the dwin- 
dling amount of bank lending to private sector non-financial corporations (PNFCs), which 
was exacerbated with the Great Recession. Many central banks aimed to revive bank lend- 
ing with quantitative easing (QE) and unconventional monetary policy. We propose an 
agent based computational economics (ACE) model which combines the main factors in 
the economic environment of QE and Basel regulatory framework to analyse why UK banks 
do not prioritize lending to non-financial businesses. The lower bond yields caused by QE 
encourage big firms to substitute away from bank borrowing to bond issuance. In addition, 
the risk weight regime of Basel II/III on capital induces banks to favour mortgages over 
business loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The combination of lower bond 
yields and Basel II/III capital requirements on banks, which, respectively, impact demand 
and supply of credit in the UK, plays a role in the drop of bank loans to businesses. The 
ACE model aims to reinstate policy regimes that form constraints and incentives for the be- 
haviour of market participants to provide the causal factors in observed macro-economic 
phenomena. 
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The great financial crisis (GFC) of 2007 produced severe recessions in major economies and raised the threat of a total
collapse of the global financial system. The crisis had major repercussions for the UK economy that witnessed an increase
in unemployment and severe contraction in GDP by about 4.7% in the last 3 quarters of 2008. Like the monetary authorities
of other countries, the Bank of England (BoE) reduced its short-term policy rate to exceptionally low levels from 5.75% to
0.5%, over the period from July 2007 to March 2009. However, lowering interest rates proved not to be sufficient to support
aggregate demand and help in the economic recovery to pre-crisis levels. Consequently, following the precedent first set by
the Bank of Japan in 2001, and more recently by the US Federal Reserve (Fed) Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAPs) programs
of November 2008, the BoE Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) launched an open-ended asset purchase program (APP) in
March 2009. Unlike conventional open market operations involving short term assets, central banks make outright purchases∗ Corresponding author. 
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Fig. 1. UK bank lending to different sectors 2006 to 2014 (a) Amounts bank lending (£Billion, RHS Totals) (b) Proportions of total lending (%). 
Notes: UK Bank lending refers to lending by monetary and financial institution (Totals on right hand side, RHS, Axis of Figure 1.a); RoW: Rest of World; 
HHs: Households; PNFCs: Private non-Financial Corporates; OFIs: Other Financial Institutions; INSs: Insurance Companies and Pension Funds. 
Source: UK ONS flow of funds project: financial accounts excel sheet 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of longer term securities (see, Haldane et al., 2016 ) under these asset purchase programs, also referred to as quantitative
easing (QE). 
As the APP was to be subsumed under the 1997 Monetary Policy Framework, priority was given to the necessity of
“increasing nominal spending growth to a rate consistent with meeting the inflation target in the medium term ”. 1 In addition,
the MPC minutes of March 5 2009 note that APP “would also mean that the banking system would be holding a higher level of
reserves in aggregate, which might cause it to increase its lending to companies and households ”. At the same time, it was also
anticipated by the MPC that APP will enhance “functioning of corporate credit markets, that should make it easier for some
types of companies to raise finance, reducing their reliance on the banking sector ” ( Ibid .) The mechanics of QE aimed at asset
purchases from non-bank financial institutions involves new electronic central bank money credited to the reserve account
of the seller’s bank which, in turn, creates a deposit of the same amount favouring the seller. This, so called bank lending
channel, which is now replete with bank reserves, is expected to increase bank lending to households and businesses. 2 To
what extent were these anticipated outcomes of QE borne out? 
As shown in Fig. 1 (a) Amounts Bank Lending (£Billion, RHS Totals), UK total bank lending saw an average growth of 5.5%
per quarter between 2007 Q1 and 2008 Q1, with the latter standing at £3.61 Trillion, suffered falls in the 4% −6% range in
the period between 2008 Q2-2009 Q2. Within a year from the start of the APP, total bank lending jumped 7% in 2010 Q1
and the lending to households and private non-financial corporates (PNFCs) peaked at £1.74 Trillion. However, over the next
3 years, total bank lending fell by 1% −3% annually. It showed a fall or little to no growth in every quarter except for 2013
Q1, probably because of funding for lending scheme (FLS) ( Churm et al. (2012) , Badeley-Chappell (2013) ). It should be noted
that when bank lending to rest of the world (ROW) is accounted for, domestic lending fell by over £200 bn. Further, lending
has been found to be skewed in the direction of mortgage lending to households with its share of total bank lending rising
from 25.69% in 2009Q1 to 38.18% by the end of 2014. In contrast, non-financial corporations and SMEs faced a fall in bank
loans with their share of total bank loans falling from 15.91% to 12.16% over the same period. One of the key drivers for
this fall in total bank loans is the extent to which non-financial firms substituted away from bank loans to bond issuance
through the portfolio rebalancing channel. As shown in Fig. 2 , from the peak of about £600bn of bank loans in September
2008, PNFCs (both big firms and SMEs) experienced a reduction of about £185 bn of banks loans with some £6 8.4 8bn of
bond issues by big firms potentially replacing bank loans from March 2009 when APP commenced to April 2014. 
A number of studies have investigated how QE policy influences the yield curve but lack details on how bank lending to
the real economy contracted, especially, the lending to SMEs (see, Goodhart and Ashworth (2012) ). Gagnon et al. (2011) em-
phasize the impact of the Fed LSAPs programs on the yields of the longer-term assets purchased under the programs. They
point out that the programs appear to be successful in decreasing the term premiums by 30 to 100 basis points. More1 This is reported in the letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer of 3 March 2009 and also in the MPC minutes of March 5 2009 
( http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20091204142322/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/chxletter _ boe050309.pdf , and http://www.bankofengland.co. 
uk/publications/minutes/Documents/mpc/pdf/2009/mpc0903.pdf ). The assets purchases are also seen to be critical to the strategy “to ease the flow of 
corporate credit… increase liquidity and trading activity in some UK financial markets and stimulate issuance by corporate borrowers and the resumption 
of capital market flows” ( Ibid) . 
2 Regarding the targeting of non-bank financial institutions, especially Insurance Companies and Pension Funds, see point 42 in the minutes of the MPC 
meeting for the 4 and 5 March 2009 available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/Documents/mpc/pdf/2009/mpc0903.pdf . 
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Fig. 2. UK PNFC Bond Stock (RHS, Blue) and PNFC Bank Borrowing (LHS, Brown) 
2006 to 2014 (£Billion). 
Notes: The variable CPMB29M is used for PNFC bonds with the stock of PNFC bonds valued at £271.297 bn from ONS is used for Dec 2005. The variable 
LPMB4VR for PNFC bank loans is used from BoE interactive website. 
Source: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/newintermed.asp . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
comprehensively, Joyce et al. (2011) specify five transmission channels of the impact of QE. This includes policy signalling,
portfolio rebalancing, liquidity, broad money, and confidence. They claim that while the effects of QE can spread directly into
the wider economy through the confidence factor leading to larger aggregate expenditure, asset prices and returns represent
the path of transmission for the other four channels. By lowering bond yields, QE can boost aggregate spending through de-
creasing the cost of borrowing for firms and consumers, Joyce et al. (2011) . Joyce et al. (2014) have also investigated the
specific mechanics of portfolio rebalancing by the non-bank financial institutional investors such as Life Insurance and Pen-
sion Funds, which substituted the assets purchased by the BoE with bonds issued by PNFCs. Equities price growth caused
by a combination of portfolio rebalancing and falling interest rates also boosts the value of legacy assets held by finan-
cial institutions, a phenomenon that is referred to as “stealth recapitalization” (see, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and
Chodorow-Reich (2014) ) that can help banks to remain buoyant. Hence, notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the
accumulation of ‘excess’ reserves at the central bank from APP (see, Reis et al., 2016 ), 3 and concerns about such extremely
loose monetary policy conditions for a prolonged period (see, Rajan (2010) , Bean et al. (2015) ) in the post GFC period, this
paper investigates a specific misdirection of bank lending in the context of QE that has resulted in a fall in bank loans to
the real economy. 
While Office for National Statistics (ONS) data in Fig. 1 (a) and 1(b) show that domestic lending by UK banks fell by
more than £218.6 billion in four years after APP was introduced early in 2009, the worrying trend is the shrinkage in
the amount of loans to UK non-financial businesses falling to as low as 12% of total lending when compared to a 50%
share of bank loans to financial companies and rest of the world. The latter two was as high as 59% in 2008Q1. Indeed,
this is part of a bigger problem of “why banks do not lend to the real economy”. This has being discussed by several
authors under the rubric of excessive growth of the financial sector in advanced economies and, in particular, growing
bank activities relating to trading assets and financialization 4 as these have a bearing on low GDP growth and its extreme
volatility ( Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2013) , Bezemer and Hudson (2016) , Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) , Arcand et al.
(2015) , Stockhammer (2004) , Easterly et al. (2001) ). The latter study by Stiglitz and his co-authors was one of the first to
signal the negative impact of the excessive growth of the financial sector. Though highly relevant, the focus of our analysis
is not on this wider problem, which also relates to banks’ chase for yield and carry trades associated with cross-border bank
lending triggered by prolonged low interest rates. Instead, this paper aims to reinstate at a micro-level the role of financial3 Between March 2009 and August 2012, the total amount of bank reserves on the liabilities side of the BoE increased from about £31.5 billion to £251.9 
billion. This increase in bank reserves at the BoE accounts for about 59% the size of APP by the end of 2012. The same phenomena of increasing bank 
reserves at the central bank appears in the US where the reserve balances with Federal Reserve expanded massively after the launch of large scale asset 
purchase (LSAP) programs in 2008. The Fed data shows that bank reserves expanded by about 812% between October 2008 and August 2012. ( Source : Data 
Download Program (DPD): http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/ ). 
4 Partnoy and Eisinger (2013) analyse the financial statements of big banks and find that the majority of their income and also outsized losses come 
from traded assets. 
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regulation, which Stiglitz (2011) raised as an urgent issue for incorporation into macro-economic models to test out systemic
and systematic impacts from the incentives and constraints inherent to regulation. 5 
Noting the large literature on the fall in bank lending during recessions, including theories on the liquidity trap where
close to zero interest rates cannot stimulate investment (for example Krugman et al. (1998) and Krugman (20 0 0) ), a rel-
atively new strand of literature on the impact on bank lending from capital adequacy requirements has evolved since the
1990s. The diverse justifications for the decreases in bank lending during recessions in the presence of capital adequacy
requirements have been based either on the lower supply of credit by banks or the lack of demand for loans. The supply-
side explanations can be grouped into two main categories. Studies in the first category (such as Thakor (1996) , and Borio
and Zhu (2012), Angelini et al. (2015) ) attribute the decrease in bank lending to the changes in the risk perception of the
banks. 6 The other category of explanations (for example, Watanabe (2007), Repullo and Suarez (2013) , and Repullo (2013) )
refers to the shortage of bank capital (the capital crunch hypothesis) as the main driver of credit rationing in the downturn
especially in the presence of pro-cyclical capital regulations (see Brunnermeier et al. (2009) ). 7 Further, the seminal work of
Jones (20 0 0) implicates banks’ regulatory capital arbitrage for prompting an individually rational but destabilizing and so-
cially deleterious response to Basel capital requirements for which Jones claims econometric models may not be best suited
to analyse. The perverse incentives of Basel II has been implicated for the large increase in leverage in banks with the use
of credit default swaps (CDS) in addition to mortgage backed securities on bank balance sheets ( Blundell-Wignall and Roul-
let (2013) and Markose et al. (2012) ) and of sovereign debt to reduce capital from the implied risk weighting, respectively,
in the carry trades associated with the GFC and in the Eurozone crisis ( Acharya and Steffan (2015) ). Following the Jones
(20 0 0) precedent, we argue that an agent based model of bank lending is needed to show how the constraints and incen-
tives of the risk weighted capital requirements of Basel II and III have a direct bearing on the direction of the bank lending,
favouring mortgages and penalizing, in particular, SMEs. 
In summary, our agent based model brings together the supply and demand sides of bank lending in granular detail. On
the demand side, the influence of APP on gilts and corporate bond yields represents the exogenously given starting point
of our ACE model. Asset purchases by BoE reduce the supply of gilts remaining for the private sector (local supply effects)
leading to lower yields on gilts and corporate bonds ( McLaren et al. (2014) ). The lower bond yields induce BFs to substitute
parts of their bank borrowing with security debt (bonds). On the supply side, influenced by the capital requirements, that
assign different risk weights for different types of loans, banks respond to the drop in big firm borrowing, by expanding
mortgages and decreasing the amount of loans granted to SMEs, which carry a higher risk weight. The mortgage market
of UK households is also modelled in detail. The distinction between big firms (BFs) and SMEs is important in the context
of this paper because the accessibility to debt financing is different for the two types of firms. BFs have access to debt
security (bond) market, whereas borrowing from banks represents the sole source of debt financing for SMEs. In the standard
perspective of the fall in the demand for loans, for instance, Bikker and Hu (2012) argue that the lack of demand for bank
loans rather than supply is the key factor in the fall in bank borrowing during slumps. 8 However, in this context, little
consideration has been given to the impact of lower bond yields (and hence the wider use of debt security) which is caused
by QE, on the demand for bank loans by big non-financial firms. This represents a vital element in our explanation of the
fall of bank lending to non-financial businesses. We argue that a detailed model rich in regulatory bank capital constraints
is needed to show how the slack caused in the bank loan portfolio rebalancing by big firms in favour of bonds post APP
impact on yield curves helped expand UK loans for mortgages at the expense of loans to SMEs. 
Methodologically, we propose a data driven formulation of the ACE model of the developments in the UK bank lend-
ing markets since APP was introduced along with the regulatory capital constraints on banks. We follow the data driven
approach described in Markose (2013) in requiring that the distributional characteristics of the different economic sectors,
such as households, non-financial businesses and banks, are based on empirical data. We implement an important empirical
scale factor to specify the numbers of agents in each class in order that they represent the UK economy. This also permits
the outputs of the ACE model to be scaled back up to give simulated results that can be validated against actual UK data.
We use Windrum et al. (2007) method for ACE model validation. 
The relevant balance sheet items of each of the 10 biggest UK banks is part of the initial conditions for the simulation
of UK bank lending decisions for mortgages and to SMEs. The use of micro-level data sets is similar to the BoE agent based
model of the UK mortgage market, Baptista et al. (2016) , in that granular institutional details and data are included to
investigate implications of specific macro-policy relevant measures that can alter behaviours of market participants by using
the simulation model for scenario analysis and comparative statics. However, while the BoE ACE focusses on the buy to let
rental market, we consider a wider loan portfolio decision model of UK banks. The important difference in banks’ behaviour5 Stiglitz (2011) , in the context of fixing macroeconomics in the post GFC era, has noted that certain ‘perverse’ incentive structures especially in the finan- 
cial sector were instrumental for the destabilizing events of the GFC. Stiglitz ( ibid ) concludes that .. “the standard macroeconomic models neither incorporated 
them nor provided an explanation for why such incentive structures would become prevalent—and these failures are failures of economic science .”
6 However, as noted by Goodhart and Ashworth (2012) , relevant factors such as default rates that affect the risk premia of different loan types, especially 
in market downturns do not feature in DSGE models. In the latter only the risk free policy rate matters. 
7 The reliance of capital regulations on the mark-to-market valuations of assets and the market-based measures of risk makes these regulations pro- 
cyclical and increases the volatility in asset markets. That is, the increases in market value of equity during booms accompanied with fixed costs of bank 
regulations induce banks to expand their lending. In contrast, during busts equity prices become low, decreasing the ability of banks to provide loans. For 
a further discussion of the pro-cyclicality of bank regulations see Brunnermeier et al. (2009) . 
8 See also, Berger and Udell (1994) . 
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with the introduction of Basel capital constraints in their portfolio allocation decision, comes about only when in addition
to the direct costs of the credit risk of default on loans, the different categories of bank loans invite an institutionalized cost
of capital implied by the Basel risk weight rule. We use data on bank write offs for each of the three categories of loans
to proxy for the probability of default on the respective loans. The simple 8% capital ratio of Basel I, results in exactly the
same optimal lending policy for banks as in the scenario of no regulatory capital requirements with the former implying an
overall upper limit on leverage for the total loan book, and a potential contraction of this, but without distinction between
the asset classes. In contrast, one of our main findings is that what was a less than rigid preference among banks in favour
of mortgages and against loans to SMEs, has become a veritable mecca of what Jordà et al. (2016) have called ‘mortgaging
up’ after the introduction of favourable risk weights on mortgages in Basel II. Of course, there has not been the aggressive
capital arbitrage by banks either through remote or synthetic securitization (see, Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2013) ) in the
post 2009 period of APP. Our results are consistent with the empirical findings that during the course of APP, the assumption
that banks extended mortgages only in response to the slack caused by big firms reducing bank loans as bond yields fell,
is a good one. Indeed, Section 4.2 shows that this expansion in mortgage loans by UK loans under Scenario 3 Basel II/III
risk weight rules came at the expense of loans to SMEs. Further, the growth of UK mortgage lending was not sufficient to
counter the decline in business loans, thereby representing the main cause of the shrinkage in total bank lending. 
It is envisaged that the data driven agent based model of the UK banking sector will be extended in a modular fashion
to encompass a more explicit characterization of the Brunnermeir and Sannikov (2012) stealth recapitalization of banks in
low interest rate regimes that fuel a financial asset price boom and also the search for yield carry trades involving emerging
market countries financed by UK banks. An additional ACE extension is needed to fully model big PNFC behaviours regarding
their option to use funds from bond issuance to buy back shares or repay loans, which is beyond the scope of the current
model which is focussed on the bank lending channel. 9 As will be explained in the literature survey, though not fully
exploited yet, this category of ACE models which we called ‘modular plug-ins’ can be built via extensions that alter the
endogenous/exogenous demarcation, viz. by endogenizing or modelling more elaborate behaviours (rather than just an if
-then- rule) for agents in certain sectors that were considered to be exogenous in the extant ACE model. The ACE approach
can do this better than other modelling techniques with the modeller creating exogenous data feeds to the model agents in
a time specific way while focussing on specific behaviours and not others. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the relevant literature. The agent-based ap-
proach used in the paper is outlined in Section 3 along with a full description of the model agents and their behaviours.
Section 4 summarizes the ACE model initial conditions followed by the simulation outcomes and model validation results.
Section 5 contains concluding remarks of the paper. 
2. The related literature 
This literature survey is divided into three subsections. The first gives a brief survey of the QE literature including that
related to the Japanese QE introduced in 2001. The second section examines some of the main papers in the field on the
impact of capital adequacy requirements on bank lending, especially, in recessions. In the last section, the literature of
agent-based computational macroeconomics (ACME) is reviewed. 
2.1. The impact of quantitative easing on bank lending 
Quantitative easing (QE) has been stimulating the academic literature since its introduction by the Bank of Japan (BoJ)
in 2001, and in particular post GFC when the monetary authorities of the US, UK and EU started to pursue unconventional
monetary policies. The main studies on QE focused on the influence of the massive asset purchases on asset yields and less
so on the macroeconomic consequences and the impact on bank lending. First, while authors agree that asset purchases
under QE have decreased the yields of government bonds ( Kimura and Small (2007) for Japan, D’Amico and King (2013) for
the US, and Daines, Joyce and Tong (2012) for the UK), the evidence on the impact on other assets yields has been mixed.
Kimura and Small (2007) point out that BoJ asset purchases led to lower premiums on higher grade corporate bonds. This
conclusion is supported by McLaren et al. (2014) who argue that asset purchases under APP reduced gilts yield and, through
local supply effects (asset purchases by BoE reduce the supply of gilts remaining for the private sector), the yields of cor-
porate bonds. They claim that the expected asset purchases had a significant impact on yields after each announcement in
March 20 09, August 20 09, and February 2012. Similar results for Fed’s LSAP programs are revealed by Gagnon et al. (2011) .
They show that the programs led to drops of 30 to 100 basis points in the risk premium component (rather than expecta-
tion component) of the longer-term yields. Conversely, Oda and Ueda (2007) show that the BoJ monetary policy at close to
zero interest rate was effective in lowering the expectations component of interest rates. However, the portfolio rebalancing
effects on the risk premium component were not significant. 
The papers that analyse the effects on the wider economy generally specify a positive influence of QE on the real
economy. For instance, Honda, Kuroki, and Tachibana (2013) and Harada and Masujima (2009) indicate that BoJ QE in-9 That funds from bond issuance have also been used to buy back shares by US and UK companies has been highlighted in the financial press (see 
Reuters, Sept 2013, Yahoo Finance 2016, Washington Post, 2018 ) and by academics (see Gordon (2018), Fried and Wang (2018) ) as a matter of great 
concern about the malaise relating to stock market bubbles, corporate indebtedness and slow growth. 
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creased aggregate output through asset prices and bank reserves. This conclusion is supported by the results for US QE
( Chen et al. (2011) and Baumeister and Benati (2013) ) and UK QE ( Kapetanios et al. (2012) ). However, the mechanics of
bank lending in response to the QE program has received relatively less attention. For example, Bowman et al. (2011) iden-
tify a positive but small impact of BoJ QE on bank lending. Joyce and Spaltro (2014) show similar outcomes for the BoE APP
program. They claim that the effects were more important for smaller banks. 
2.2. Bank lending and capital adequacy requirements 
The influence of capital requirements on bank lending and bank behaviour has been investigated since the introduction
of Basel rules in the late 1980s. Thakor (1996) inspects the role played by Basel capital rules in the developments in the US
banking system in the early 1990s including the fall in aggregate bank lending and the increase in the share of government
debt securities holding in the portfolios of US banks. He indicates that an expansionary monetary policy in the presence
of capital requirements may either increase or decrease bank lending depending on the impact of the increasing money
supply on the term structure of the interest rates. The view that weakly capitalized banks tend to substitute away from
assets with higher risk weights and cut their total lending to enhance their capital ratios is supported by several authors. 10 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) who specify that banks, with weaker capital ratios and greater dependence on
market funding and non-interest income sources, strongly decreased their lending during the crisis. Moreover, Heid, Porath
and Stolz (2004) results show that a fall in capital buffers induces banks to rebuild them by raising capital and lowering
risk-weighted assets by investing more in the safer assets and less of the riskier assets. However, although most of the
literature focuses on the role of the supply of credit, some studies attribute the decreases in bank lending in recessions
to demand factors. Berger and Udell (1994) investigate the causes of the reallocation of credit by U.S. commercial banks
from loans to securities in the early 1990s. Their results indicate that while risk-related credit crunch hypotheses are not
salient reasons for the fall in bank lending, demand-side impact on lending tend to be strong. More recently, Bikker and Hu
(2002) argue that credit rationing in a cyclical downturn is not driven by a shortage in bank capital as the capital crunch
hypothesis suggests. They show that while the demand factors dominate the market, the preeminent loans supply variables
(bank capital and reserves) tend to be insignificant determinants of bank lending. 
As many of these papers rely on econometric analysis, conclusions such as weakly capitalized firms switch to lower
risk weighted assets is highlighted as an individually rational thing to reduce capital requirements, few papers take this
forward as part of the macro-economic framework. Despite an influential survey of Furfine et al. (1999) that asks hard
questions regarding whether the Basel regulatory framework led to systematic trends in bank lending and in particular the
role of perverse incentives flagged out in detail in Jones (20 0 0) in the form of capital arbitrage, few macroeconomic models
aim to include the incentives and constraints posed by Basel rules for the macroscopic implications of this for the wider
problem that banks are lending less and less to non-financial corporations, especially to SMEs. As noted in the introduction,
this paper follows this route. In Markose et al. (2012) , an agent based model similar in the data driven formulation of the
model in this paper, found that the big US banks were involved in a CDS carry trade in the run up to the 2007 GFC, but
without the favorable 20% risk weight from synthetic securitization that permitted banks to reduce capital from 8% on bank
assets to 1.6% with the 20% risk weight that follows from the adoption of credit risk transfer by holding of CDS from AAA
guarantors (like AIG), the extremely high levels of leverage on balance sheets of US FDIC big banks could not have been
achieved. Likewise, Acharya and Steffan (2015) gives the following analysis for the Eurozone crisis as a case of regulatory
capital arbitrage due to Basel II regulations, which assign a zero-risk weight for investments in sovereign debt. They argue
that governments themselves could have had incentives to preserve the zero-risk weight in order to increase demand for
high risk sovereign debt. Acharya and Steffan (2015) state that “Undercapitalized banks, that is, banks with low Tier 1 capital
ratios, have incentives to increase short-term return on equity by shifting their portfolios into the highest-yielding assets
with the lowest risk weights in an attempt to meet regulatory capital requirements without having to issue economic capital
(regulatory capital arbitrage)”. As will be pointed out in the next section, an ACE model is well placed to test out perverse
incentives that lead to destabilizing effects of policy. 
2.3. Agent-Based computational (ACE) macroeconomics 
The study of the economy by means of ACME and network analysis is a relatively new field. It also represents a suitable
approach to respond to the criticisms of the generic representative agent model of mainstream macroeconomic models. 11 
Macroeconomists have been accused of a heavy dependence on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that
are built around special cases where market inefficiencies are not possible ( Stiglitz (2011) ) and institutional details and
financial interconnections in the provision of liquidity, capital adequacy, solvency and contagion based negative externalities
are ignored ( Markose (2013) ). Critics of the standard macro models have targeted the equilibrium assumption that not only
nets out all private credit, these models cannot incorporate herd behaviour and network effects, Akerlof (2002) , and also
carry trades from perverse incentives that result in destabilising phenomena in the real world, Colander et al. (2009) . 10 For example, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), Rime (2001) , and Furfine (2000) . 
11 DelliGatti et al. (2008, 2010), Arthur (2006), Buiter (2009), Wieland (2010), Stiglitz (2011), Kirman (2006, 2010), Collander et al. (2009) , among others. 
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For our purposes existing ACME models can be classified into two main categories: those that produce qualitative results
and those that are data driven. The bulk of the ACME involves qualitative models in which stylized boom bust dynamics are
produced. This can be done by relaxing rational expectations and using adaptive learning or explicit herding behaviours (see
Gaffeo et al., 2008 ). Lengnick (2013) gives a simple baseline model. A recent survey of the ACEME is given in Dawid and
Delligatti (2018) . 
In the second category of ACME, we have those purported to represent massive real economy models. Models such as
EURACE and ASPEN projects attempt to, respectively, simulate the entire EU and US economies. These models have been
used to investigate the impact of policy interventions in the US and the Euro Area. For example, Teglio, Raberto and Cincotti
(2012) use the EURACE environment to assess the impact of capital adequacy requirements on the wider economy. They
perform simulations over a 40-year period and examine the short, medium and long run implications of different levels of
capital adequacy ratios. Their results show a non-trivial impact of capital adequacy ratios on GDP, the unemployment rate
and the aggregate capital stock. They also point out that this influence of the capital adequacy ratios arises from the credit
channel, and varies significantly depending on the time span of the evaluation period. 
The subset of the data based ACE and the most recent category, including the model of this paper, follow the approach
suggested by Markose (2013) and it is closest in spirit to the BoE agent based model for the UK mortgage market of
Battista et al. (2016) . The specificity of institutional details and policy conditions are finely modelled to analyze the re-
sponses of the relevant economic agents. Micro level data sets for the economy are used to calibrate the model agents and
flow of funds constraints are strictly adhered to. In other words, the endogenous/exogenous demarcation can be made in
ACE models with the relevant exogenous empirical data that can be specified as ‘data agents’ can feed into or inform the
model agents in ways specified by the modeller. In Markose et al. (2012) , the ACE model was used to see the consequences
of the credit risk transfer rule in Basel II that gave a 20% risk weight to bank assets that had AAA guarantors providing
CDS cover. It is argued that rule following behaviour as in complying with the regulation and availing of the full extent of
its incentives, and also the conduct of carry trade activities are relatively easy to implement in ACE. This is because unlike
fully fledged adaptive behaviour, agents’ strategies, intelligence and autonomy are limited to following the letter of the law
and strictly verifying conditions for which the most profitable arbitrage applies and also tracking the resulting self-reflexive
deterioration of the risk in bank assets as agents herd into them. Stress tests for perverse incentives of policy are among
the easiest of multi-agent exercises and it should be de rigueur in macro-prudential policy in order that flawed policies do
not get perpetuated. 
3. Methodology of data driven Agent-based model of UK bank lending 
3.1. Data characteristics of agents 
We model the developments in bank lending in the UK after the introduction of APP in 2009 using an ABM with four
classes of agents: households (HHs), big firms (BFs), small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and banks (Bs)). The UK economy
data for each of these classes of agents around the launch of APP in 2009, described below and also in the Appendix, is used
as empirical basis of the initial conditions both for the numbers of agents in each class and also for relevant balance sheet
data of agents for the ACE model. The latter is purported to simulate agents’ interactions in the UK bank lending markets
on a monthly basis for a period of 50 months from the advent of the BoE APP in 2009. 
Our approach can be divided into five main steps. Firstly, our data driven ACE methodology is innovative in proposing
a scale factor for the ABM and the real economy. The size of agent classes is set in a way that replicates the actual sizes
of agent populations in the UK based on data from the ONS, BoE financial statistics, Nationwide , and The Money Charity
around the launch of APP in March 2009.We implement a proportional scaling factor calculated using the actual sizes of the
UK households and nonfinancial business populations as follows. The number of households with at least one adult working
in 2009 was 21.46 million. 12 Additionally, in 2009 there were 4.923 million businesses, 99.9% (i.e. 4.918 million) of which
were SMEs 13 and the remaining (i.e. 0.005 million) were BFs. This indicates proportions of 0.229 and 0.0 0 024 between
the number of SMEs and BFs, respectively, and the number of HHs. Hence, since the number of HHs in the ABM is set to
10 0,0 0 0, the numbers of SMEs and BFs will be set to 22,900 and 24, respectively. As for banks, the data on 10 largest UK
banks that account for over 87% of bank lending is used. 
We will briefly describe how the incomes of the 10 0,0 0 0 HHs in the ABM are set to represent the UK income distribution
for 2009. This is needed for the purpose of modelling HHs’ mortgage affordability used by banks as a lending criterion. We
simulate the income distribution for the 10 0,0 0 0 model household agents from the UK income distribution given in deciles
in Fig. 3 below from the Department of work and Pensions. We combine the data from the latter with that from the Institute
for Fiscal Studies (IFS). 14 IFS estimates the average weekly income of a household in the 2008–09 financial year as £560.6412 In 2009, there were 25.83 million households where 16.9% of them were without work (i.e. with no adult working). The model assumes that only 
households with a working adult are eligible for mortgages to buy houses. 
13 Small and Medium Enterprise Statistics for the UK and Regions; Enterprise Directorate; The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS); 
Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110920151722/http:/stats.bis.gov.uk/ed/sme/index.htm . 
14 Institute for Fiscal Studies: Inequality and Poverty Spreadsheet which “provides data on British living standards, inequality and poverty” available at: 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/tools _ and _ resources/incomes _ in _ uk . 
Please cite this article as: M. Fatouh, S. Markose and S. Giansante, The impact of quantitative easing on UK bank lending: 
Why banks do not lend to businesses? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019. 
02.023 
8 M. Fatouh, S. Markose and S. Giansante / Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: JEBO [m3Gsc; March 16, 2019;3:10 ] 
Fig. 3. The probability distribution of household weekly income (2008–09). 
Source: Households below average income (HBAI): 1994/95 to 2008/09; P.15; Department for Work and Pensions; Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/households- below- average- income- hbai- 199495- to- 200809 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(an equivalent of £2429.43 per month 15 ) with 50% of the households making £450.52 or less a week (or £1951.84 a month)
and about 3.6 million or 16.7% of households earning over £10 0 0 per week (or £4333.33 per month). Note, for purposes of
modelling HHs mortgage affordability used by banks as a lending criterion, we use the deciles given in Fig. 3 below based
on the monthly equivalents of the weekly income data. 
ONS home ownership and renting data 16 indicates that 64% of homes in the UK are owner-occupied (the remaining
36% of homes are rented), and that about 52% of the homeowners have mortgage obligations. This yields the probability
distribution for the number of houses per household in the initial period as follows. Of the 64% of home owners, we assume
an equal 16% probability that they can own up to 4 additional houses. The value of the average UK mortgage peaked at about
£50,0 0 0 in 20 07 Q4 and then fell below £48,0 0 0 in 2010 Q2, taking 4 years till 2013 to recover to the pre-crisis peak. The
UK average house price peaked at about £180,0 0 0 in 20 07 Q2, which then fell to below £158,0 0 0 in 20 08Q4 and then
recovering to the pre-crisis peak by 2014 Q1. 17 
Second, each agent is given a balance sheet representing its initial conditions in 2009 Q1. ONS data indicates that cash
holdings of households represented about 14.43% of their total assets at the end of 2008 18 while the cash holdings of non-
financial businesses at that date represented about 12.83% of their total assets. At initial date BFs and SMEs are respectively
assigned bank loans averaging 31.87% and 40% of their total liabilities, while BFs are shown to have bond stock valued at
19.79% of their total liabilities. BFs are assigned physical capital by using a uniform distribution over the range of £5 million
to £100 billion of physical capital. We take the ONS data for 2009 for UK Gross Capital Stock, 19 which is £2202.6 billion and
therefore has an average value of about £447 million for the 4.923 million UK businesses. Hence, our distribution implies
big firm capital to be highly skewed with over 50% of BFs with capital in excess of £50bn. In contrast, we assume the SME
physical capital distribution to range from £50,0 0 0 to £1 million. Finally, in the case of data for banks, the exact relevant
items of the balance sheets of the 10 largest UK banks in 2009 (see Appendix Fig. A2 ) are used. 
In step three, households and non-financial firms are allocated to the 10 banks using relevant probability distributions.
For instance, each of the UK banks is assigned 10,0 0 0 households as customers, distributed according to the income deciles
given in Fig. 3 using monthly equivalents. Likewise, a similar distribution is made for BFs and SMEs as customers of the 10
UK banks. The 10 banks then receive a horizontal sum of deposits and make loans based on the above customer assignment.
In the fourth step, the behavioural rules of the agents are defined. This constitutes the main engine of the ABM and is
described in detail in Section 3.2 . These rules describe the responses of the agents to different developments. For instance, a15 Monthly income = Weekly Income x 52 (weeks a year) / 12 (months a year). 
16 This can be found at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011- census/detailed- characteristics- on- housing- for- local- authorities- in- england- and- wales/ 
short-story-on-detailed-characteristics.html . 
17 Source: Nationwide House Price Index ( http://www.nationwide.co.uk/about/house- price- index/download- data#xtab:uk-series ). 
18 This is calculated by taking the ratio of the sum of households’ currency and deposits (£1,172.47 billion) with the sum of households’ financial liabilities 
and net worth at the end of 2008 (£1,550.13 billion and £6,573.64 billion,respectively). The latter two yield the total assets of the household sector from 
the ONS Sectoral Financial Accounts. 
19 This can be found at https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/datasets/capitalstock . 
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big firm responds to a fall in the cost of bond issuance by replacing part of its bank loans with bonds. Then, in the fifth step
of the process, 50 simulations are run for the three different scenarios for bank behaviour to investigate the role played by
Basel capital adequacy rules in conjunction with the BF response to falling bond yields with APP. At the end of this stage,
the values of bank lending aggregates to households and nonfinancial businesses are simulated for each of the 50 months.
Finally, the simulated bank lending aggregates are rescaled up and compared to the actual UK bank lending aggregates for
purposes of model validation. 
3.2. The ACE model 
The model of this paper outlined in Fig. 4 has an the endogenous segment (the dashed area in Fig. 4 ), which is embedded
within the wider economy where the relevant variables relating to the central bank, labour market, goods and services
market, housing market, and capital markets are taken to be exogenous. 
Following the assignment of non-bank agents within the endogenous dashed segment as customers of banks, both banks
and non-banks make their respective decisions whilst responding to the exogenously given data from outside the dashed
segment in Fig. 4 . HHs and businesses deposit cash in their assigned banks. HHs and businesses also seek to obtain mort-
gages and bank loans, respectively, as conditions permit from their assigned banks. This implies that the assets and liabilities
in the balance sheet of any bank are the horizontal sums of the corresponding assets and liabilities in the balance sheets
of the agents who are assigned to this bank. For example, the amount of deposits on the liabilities side of a bank’s balance
sheet is the sum of the deposits of all HHs, BFs, and SMEs who are the customers of this bank. 
Nonfinancial firms (BFs and SMEs) employ physical capital and cash to operate and finance their operations using a
mixture of debt financing and equity. The amount of initial physical capital (and total assets) briefly described above and in
the Appendix defines the firm’s size which, in turn, determines its accessibility to different debt markets. While SMEs are
restricted to bank borrowing, BFs can also issue debt securities. Banks accept deposits of HHs, BFs and SMEs, and provide
loans in the form of mortgages to households and business loans to BFs and SMEs. A further description of the initial
conditions of the agents and the behaviour of these agents over the simulation period will be presented in the next sections.Please cite this article as: M. Fatouh, S. Markose and S. Giansante, The impact of quantitative easing on UK bank lending: 
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3.3. Agents’ behaviours 
This section will set out the responses of the model agents to the developments in their surrounding environment
and the subsequent interactions of one another within the endogenous segment of Fig. 4 . According to Daines, Joyce and
Tong (2012) , the first round of BoE purchases caused a 100 basis points fall in gilts yields. Hence, the impact of BoE’s APP
is introduced into the model by allowing gilts rate to decrease by 2.5 basis points each period. This fall in gilts yield ac-
companied by the low policy rate results in changes in the relative cost of corporate bonds and consequently has significant
implications for BFs. The reaction of banks to this fall in BFs’ borrowing depends on the capital adequacy regime in oper-
ation. Hence, the behaviour of banks is investigated under three scenarios that reflect three possible capital requirements
regimes. The latter influences the lending behaviour of banks to households and SMEs. 
3.3.1. Households behaviour 
We assume each household earns an income and accumulates its wealth at each period only in the form of houses and
cash deposited with its assigned bank. The demand for mortgages is governed by HH incomes. It is assumed that HHs’
incomes fluctuates by 0.275% each month in line with inflation between March 2009 and March 2013 as average annual
inflation rate in the UK was 3.3% during that period. 
H H I i,t = H H I i,t−1 ×
(
1 + 0 . 033 
12 
)
(1) 
Here, HHI i, t is the income of household i in period t . 
We assume that HHs keep constant their expenditure habits of spending between 66% −70% of income on consump-
tion. 20 The remaining 30% −34% of income is added to HH cash reserves, which are used to pay the mortgage obligations
(mortgage principal and interest) and to cover the deposit if a new mortgage is obtained. Denoting housing wealth of house-
hold i in period t as HHH i, t , it can grow only with a new house purchase based with the allocation of a new mortgage
denoted by, NM i, t , to household i in period t with a 5% loan to value ratio in the benchmark simulation: 
H H H i,t = H H H i,t−1 + 
1 
0 . 95 
× N M i,t (2) 
The conditions regarding whether a HH makes a mortgage application and the acceptance of the same by the bank it
is assigned to, is determined in part as follows. A HH who is a first time buyer is given a higher probability of making a
mortgage application of 30% compared to that of a 20% probability for those who already own one. In the eligibility criteria,
HH disposable income or cash at time after mortgage payments is denoted as HHC i, t , and MP i, t is the mortgage repayment
made by household i to their bank in period t. This is given in (3) , with PP i, t and IP i, t , respectively, denoting principal and
interest parts of the mortgage payment and given in (4) . 
H H C i,t = H H C i,t−1 + 0 . 3 H H I i,t −
0 . 05 
0 . 95 
N M i,t − M P i,t (3)
M P i,t = P P i,t + I P i,t (4) 
Here, mortgage principal repayments and interest payments are calculated as in (5) and (6) . 
P P i,t = 
0 . 95 
360 
× No M i,t × H P t−1 , (5) 
I P i,t = 
r HH,t−1 
12 
× H H M i,t−1 (6) 
Note, HP t : house price in period t; NoM i, t : the number of mortgages owed by household i in period t; HHM i, t : the
mortgage indebtedness of household i in period t; r HH, t : interest rate on mortgages in period t . In Eq. (7) , we denote MElg i, t 
as the indicator for mortgage eligibility of household i in its application for a new mortgage in period t and MAv b ( i ), t is an
indicator for new mortgages which determines whether the bank assigned to household i is willing to lend. The value of
this indicator will be derived from the bank behaviour described below. These minimum requirements employed by the banks
are given in (7) . To obtain a new mortgage, banks require the applicant HH to have a disposable income, H H C i,t−1 , that is
at least twice the down payment or the deposit (5% of the house price (0.05 × HP t ) and have no more than 5 mortgages.
Further, mortgage payment in the coming month should be no more than 40% of HH income, viz. M P i,t+1 ≤ 0 . 4 × H H I i,t in
(7) . 
MEl g i,t = 
{
1 i f H H C i,t−1 ≥ 2 × 0 . 05 × H P t and M P i,t+1 ≤ 0 . 4 × H H I i,t and No M i,t−1 < 5 
0 Otherwise 
}
(7) 20 This is in keeping with the UK consumption to GDP ratio. In 2009 this was around 66.134%, see https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS? 
locations=GB . We randomly assign the 10 0,0 0 0 households to have a consumption to income ratio in the range of 66% −70%. 
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Thus, the value of the new mortgage, NM i, t , is given in (8) as the house price less deposit if the conditions in (7) are
met under the provisothat the bank is able to do so. 
N M i,t = 
{
H P t × ( 1 − 0 . 05 ) i f M A v b ( i ) ,t = 1 , M El g i,t = 1 
0 Otherwise 
}
. (8)
Eq. (10) gives the HH net worth or equity at time t, HHE i, t , as its housing wealth plus cash assets less mortgage debt,
HHM i, t , which is defined in (9) as the mortgage debt in period t-1 less principal and interest payment in t plus new mort-
gage at t: 
H H M i,t = H H M i,t−1 − P P i,t + N M i,t (9)
H H E i,t = H H H i,t−1 + H H C i,t − H H M i,t . (10)
3.3.2. Big Firms (BFs) behaviour 
As stated earlier, BoE’s APP decreases the cost of corporate bonds which triggers portfolio rebalancing. This induces BFs
to replace part of their bank loans with corporate bonds and this section will specify the behavioural rule that BFs will
use for this. The model assumes that BFs keep the size of physical capital and total debt unchanged, issue no new equity,
and maintain a constant annual operating profit (i.e. profit before interest payments) to total assets ratio of 10%. 21 In each
period, a BF chooses the debt financing mixture to improve its net profit ( π i, t ) which is the difference between its operating
profit ( OPP i, t ) and the cost of debt financing: 
πi,t = BF OP P i,t − r S,t .BF B d i,t − r BF,t .BF B L i,t . (11)
Here, r S, t and r BF, t : the interest rates on bonds and bank loans, respectively, in period t; BFBd i, t : the amount outstanding
of BF i ’s bonds in period t; BFBL i, t : the amount of bank loans owed by big firm i in period t . The comparisons between bank
borrowing and corporate bond issuance are based on the interest costs of the two sources. BFs will respond to decreases
in bonds interest rate ( r S ), when it becomes equal to or smaller than the interest rate on bank borrowing ( r BF ), by issuing
more bonds and using the proceeds to repay part of their bank loans. In other words, the debt mixture of BFs is restructured
towards more corporate debt and less bank loans on average during the APP period. 22 
Note, the exogenous components of a BF balance sheet in any period t to do with physical capital and gross operat-
ing profits of BFs will be anchored in empirical data. Eq. (12) states that the physical capital of the BF, BFPhC i, t , remains
unchanged from one period to the next, anchored by the initial distribution, 
BF P h C i,t = BF P h C i,t−1 . (12)
Eq. (13) states the assumption that BF gross operating profits grow at empirically relevant rates in terms of its physical
capital at time t: 
BF OP P i,t = 0 . 10 × ( BF P h C i,t−1 ) . (13)
The BF cash holdings, BFC i, t , is net of the interest payments on its corporate bonds and bank loans: 
BF C i,t = BF C i,t−1 + BF OP P i,t − r S,t .BF B d i,t−1 − r BF ( t ) .BF B L i,t−1 . (14)
The change in the debt composition of big firm i in period t, BFDC i, t , which is key to the portfolio balancing response
to the lower yield on debt as a result of APP is given as follows in the behavioural rule (15) . The status quo, with bank loans
favoured over bond issuance, is maintained if, as stated in (15) , the bond yield, r S,t is greater than interest on bank loans,
r BF,t . If the opposite is the case, BFs reduce their bank loans by upto 1.45% 
23 as follows: 
BF D C i,t = 
{
0 i f r S,t ≥ r BF,t 
Random [ −0 . 014598 ; 0 ] i f r S,t < r BF,t 
}
(15)
BF B L i,t = BF B L i,t−1 + BF D C i,t (16)
BF B d i,t = BF B d i,t−1 − BF D C i,t . (17)
Hence, the net worth or equity of firms, BFE i, t , is given as : BF E i,t = BF P h C i,t + BF C i,t − BF B L i,t − BF B d i,t . (18) 
21 A 10% annual return on gross fixed capital stock for UK PNFCs is a good assumption. Data on annual Rates of Return for PNFCs given by ONS is 
estimated as the ratio of gross operating surplus (numerator) on gross fixed capital stock (denominator) and can be found at Table 1: https://www.ons. 
gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/datasets/profitabilityofukcompaniesreferencetable . In 2009 this was 10.8% and in years pertinent to our 
analysis, it was around 11.6%. 
22 In a future edition of our ACE model, the extent to which funds raised by BFs from bonds are apportioned between repayment of bank loans and share 
repurchases will be modeled more explicitly. An explicit BF model that maximizes earnings per share (EPS) or net profits divided by the number of shares 
outstanding indicates that the return on capital, ROE, can be increased either by increasing net profits (lowering the debt cost in our analysis) or reducing 
the number of shares outstanding through share repurchases or buybacks. Given the complex issues involved here, see footnote 9, a fuller model for big 
firm behavior that relates to maximizing shareholder value and on the debt/equity structure is beyond the scope of this ACE model. 
23 This is a historically relevant maximum fall in bank loans in a month for non-financial firms. 
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3.3.3. Bank lending behaviour 
As indicated, new bank lending for mortgages and to SMEs is driven by the portfolio rebalancing implemented by BFs
in response to APP induced lower bond yields. We assume that banks do not issue new externally financed equity, and
do not distribute any dividends and hence avail of new equity only from retained earnings or as relevant by changing the
composition of its risk weighted assets. Banks aim to smooth their total stock of lending to HHs and non-financial firms and
if they suffer reduced loan demand or increased loan repayments by BFs, they will attempt to compensate this by lending
more to HHs for mortgages or to SMEs subject to capital constraints and perceived credit risks. To investigate the impact of
regulatory capital adequacy requirements, the ACE model implements three different scenarios: no capital requirements, a
Basel I simple capital requirements where equity capital is a fixed 8% proportion of total lending, and the more complex case
where equity capital satisfies a ratio of risk weighted assets. The main behavioural difference that the introduction of Basel
rules have brought about is an addition of risk weights to the banks’ use of credit risk estimates on an ad hominem basis
in the pre Basel regime. 24 This involves an institutionalized implementation of a Basel compliant cost of capital measure.
In summary : To track the impact of a QE-generated fall in demand for bank loans by BFs, banks change their portfolio of
loans only to optimally accommodate the slack in demand in the total lending due to big firm substitution away from bank
loans. 
3.3.3.1. Scenario I: no capital requirements. In this scenario, banks do not have regulatory equity capital requirements. A bank
grants mortgages and loans to SMEs to maximize its profit πB,t , which is given by the following equation: 
πB,t = 
∑ 
r i,t . L i,t −
∑ 
s i,t . ( L i,t ) . L i,t (19) 
Here i = { BF, HH, SME }: the agent class; L i,t : bank lending to agent of loan class i at time t; r i,t : interest rate on class i
loan at time t; s i,t (L i,t ) : default risk cost of class i loan at time t (i.e. the probability that an debtor of class i loan defaults)
which increases in the amount of lending to agents for class i loans. We assume that the default risk costs are quadratic,
s i,t (L i,t ) = L i,t 2 . As discussed earlier, banks proxy the default risk for each class of loans in terms of the non-performing loans
at each time t reported as write offs by UK banks for the loan class (see Appendix Fig. A1 ). In Eqs. (20) and (21) , the optimal
amounts of mortgages and loans to SMEs are determined by the difference between own interest rate and the interest rate
on the other class of loans ( r HH and r SME ), the ratio of the default risk of the other loan product to the total default risk of
both loan products and the amount available for investment in the two types (i.e. the amount of total lending minus loans
to BFs). In other words, the second condition implies that banks increase bank loans to the one class, when the default risk
on the other class increases, ceteris paribus. In order to keep the basic assumption of portfolio rebalancing for banks the
same for all scenarios, we assume that banks aim to keep the amount of total lending, aggregated over the three categories
of loans fixed, 25 ( L Tot = L BF,t + L HH,t + L SME,t ), and they only aim to reallocate optimally between HHs and SMEs of what
remains the target loan total after adjusting for the wholly demand determined BF loan. We have the optimal amount of
bank loans to households for mortgages, L ∗HH, t , and SME loans, L ∗SME, t , in (20) and (21) , respectively: 26 
L ∗HH,t = 
( r HH,t − r SME,t ) + 2 s SME,t ( L Tot,t − L BF,t ) 
2 ( s HH,t + s SME,t ) 
(20) 
L ∗SME ,t = 
( r SME ,t − r HH ,t ) + 2 s HH ,t ( L Tot ,t − L BF ,t ) 
2 ( s HH ,t + s SME ,t ) 
. (21) 
The first result here is that the banks operate without an explicit cost of capital, and even if there are larger default
costs on loans to SMEs in (20) , s SME, t > s HH, t , this need not imply a natural bias toward mortgage loans as r SME could be
sufficiently greater than r HH . However, Eqs. (20) and (21) indicate that a fall in loans to BFs, viz  L BF, t < 0, driven by the
lower bond yields, could induce banks to increase their supply of mortgages to HHs to a greater extent than loans to SMEs
as the rates of default in the latter are typically higher than the former. As shown in Appendix 1, in 2009 Q1 the write offs
on mortgages, which is used to proxy default risk, far exceeded that on SME loans. However, over the period of the start of
APP to 2014, SME loan write offs increased while those for mortgages fell. Thus, when BF loans fall, whether or not banks
increase SME loans more relative to household mortgages are governed by the respective comparative static conditions,
which we denote as ɵ HH and ɵ SME , involving the relevant credit risk on the other loan: 
θHH = ∂ L HH,t 
∂ L BF,t 
= −s SME,t 
s HH,t + s SME,t 
< 0 , (22) 
θSME = ∂ L SME,t 
∂ L BF,t 
= −s HH,t 
s HH,t + s SME,t 
< 0 . (23) 24 For purposes of the ACE model, note that default risk is not assessed on the basis of individual loans, but on the class of loans for which empirical 
data is used. 
25 This is subject to the capital adequacy conditions in Scenarios 2 and 3. 
26 Note given the assumptions made, the optimal lending equations in (20) and (21) are obtained from the profit function given as πB.t = r BF,t L BF,t + 
r HH,t L HH,t + r SME,t ( L Tot − L BF,t − L HH,t ) − s BF,t L 2 BF,t − s HH,t L 2 HH,t − s SME,t ( L Tot,t − L BF,t − L HH,t ) 2 . 
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Eqs. (22) and (23) imply that in Scenario 1, banks will increase both mortgages and SME loans in response to a slack
created by the fall in BF loans,  L BF, t < 0. Hence, each bank follows the following optimal rules when deciding the supply
of new loans ( L HH, t , and L SME, t ): 
L HH,t = L ∗HH,t − L HH,t−1 + θHH ( L BF,t ) , (24)
L SME,t = L ∗SME,t − L SME,t−1 + θSME ( L BF,t ) . (25)
Eqs. (24) and (25) combine the optimal loan levels ( L ∗HH,t and L 
∗
SME,t ) given in Eqs. (20) and (21) along with the impact of
changes in BF demand for banks loans given in Eqs. (22) and (23) . 
3.3.3.2. Scenario II: simple capital requirements with no risk weights. To introduce the capital adequacy requirements,
which state that at least a fraction γ Req of bank assets must be financed by equity, into the model, we follow Aliaga-
Díaz et al. (2011) who state that if a bank has insufficient capital, it is subject to a cost that increases with the distance
between the required capital to asset ratio and the actual one. Hence, the profit function of a bank in this case becomes: 
πB,t = 
∑ 
( r i,t − δ) . L i,t −
∑ 
s i,t . ( L i,t ) . L i,t −
(
μ. log 
(
1 
γt 
− 1 
γreq 
))
. L Tot,t . (26)
Here E : bank equity capital; δ = σ. ( E t−1 / L Tot,t ) : the cost of equity capital per £1 of total lending; σ : the cost of equity
capital estimated by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 27 In the last term in (26) , which we denote by β =
μ.log( 1 γ − 1 γreq ) , is the cost of having insufficient equity or the cost of noncompliance with the capital rules, and we can
aggregate these costs α = δ + β , as they apply to total lending. Note 1/ γ is the leverage, which in the case of 8% capital
ratio, is 12.5. The main change in the banks’ calculation of the profitability of loans as compared to the case of a simple
regulatory capital requirement is the direct cost of equity, δ, in (26) and also the penalty for deviations from the Basel
approved leverage. The operational aspects of the binding capital constraints are governed by the μ which is an indicator
function in Eq. (26) the values for which are defined as follows: 
μ = 
⎧ ⎨ 
⎩ 
1 if γt < 0 . 08 
0 if 0 . 10 ≥ γt ≥ 0 . 08 
0 if γt > 0 . 10 
⎫ ⎬ 
⎭ . (27)
In addition to the required equity to assets ratio ( γ Req ) of 8%, an optional buffer of 2% is stipulated as in Repullo and
Suarez (2013) . The cost of noncompliance with the capital rules is assumed to be very high and can lead to bank failure.
To avoid this high cost, banks try to keep equity to asset ratio very close to 10%. In other words, each bank will change its
total lending to ensure that equity to total lending ratio is between 8% and 10% (i.e. 8% <γ t < 10%). This means that the
upper bound of the feasible amount of total lending in any period t ( L Tot,t ) which maintains the 10% equity to total lending
is estimated: 
L Tot ,t = 10 E t−1 = 
∑ 
L i,t , if 8% < γt−1 < 10% and L Tot ,t 
# 
< L Tot ,t if γt−1 < 8% . (28)
Thus, total lending has to be reduced from L Tot,t if γ t-1 < 8% and we will denote this as L Tot,t 
# . 
Accordingly, the profit function of the bank can be rewritten as follows: 
πB,t = 
∑ 
( r i,t − δ) .L i,t −
∑ 
s i,t . ( L i,t ) .L i,t −
(
μ. log 
(
1 
γt 
− 1 
γreq 
))
. L Tot ,t . (29)
As the total capital costs α = δ + β , apply equally to every £1 lent irrespective of the category of loan, the optimal
amounts of mortgages and loans to SMEs in this Scenario 2 (highlighted with a double asterisks ∗∗) correspond with the
result in Scenario (1) ,with the only difference being the upper bound and (the capital constrained lower bound) of the total
amount of lending being given by L Tot,t in (28) . 
L ∗∗HH,t = 
( ( r HH,t − α) − ( r SME,t − α) ) + 2 s SME,t 
(
L Tot,t − L BF,t 
)
2 ( s HH,t + s SME,t ) 
= ( 
r HH,t − r SME,t ) + 2 s SME,t 
(
L Tot,t − L BF,t 
)
2 ( s HH,t + s SME,t ) 
(31)
L ∗∗SME,t = 
( ( r SME,t − α) − ( r HH,t − α) ) + 2 s HH,t 
(
L Tot,t − L BF,t 
)
2 ( s HH,t + s SME,t ) 
= ( 
r SME,t − r HH,t ) + 2 s HH,t 
(
L Tot,t − L BF,t 
)
2 ( s HH,t + s SME,t ) 
. (32)
Eqs. (31) & (32) indicate that a fall in loans to BFs induces banks to increase its supply of mortgages and loans to SMEs
using the comparative static conditions ɵ HH and ɵ SME Eqs. (22) & (23) as in Scenario I. The behavioural rules a bank follows27 For example, see Rizzi (2013) . 
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when deciding the supply of new loans to be granted ( L HH, t , and L SME, t ) depend on the value of its equity to total
lending in the previous period ( γ t-1 ). In this context, we distinguish between the three possible cases shown below. 
Case. A: ϻ= 0 and 8% < γ t-1 < 10% : 
In this case a bank will maintain its total lending unchanged, and will change the size of mortgages and loans to SMEs
only if there was a change in the stock of its loans to BFs: 
L HH,t = θHH . ( L BF,t ) , (33) 
L SME,t = θSME . ( L BF,t ) . (34) 
Case. B: ϻ= 0 and γ t-1 > 10% : 
In this case, the bank has excess lending capacity that it can use to grant more mortgages and loans to SMEs. Conse-
quently, analogous to Scenario I, the supply of new loans to be granted will be as follows: 
L HH,t = L ∗∗HH,t − L HH,t−1 + θHH ( L BF,t ) , (35) 
L SME,t = L ∗∗SME,t − L SME,t−1 + θSME ( L BF,t ) . (36) 
Case. C: ϻ= 1 (or γ t-1 < 8% ): 
A bank facing this situation is over-lending and will decrease its total lending to L Tot,t 
# as noted in (28) to decrease the
cost of noncompliance with the capital adequacy rules. The behavioural rules will follow (35) and (36) with L Tot,t 
# providing
the capital complaint upper bound for total loans given there. 
3.3.3.3. Scenario III: complex fractional capital requirements with risk weights . Like Scenario II, banks are required to finance
a fraction of their asset using equity capital. However, the capital requirements in Scenario III assign different risk weights
to different types of assets following Basel II/III and the capital requirements take the form of an equity to risk weighted asset
ratio specified in below in (37) . The profit function of a bank in this case takes the following formula, which is analogous
to the non-risk weighted leverage ratio constraints on banks in (29) , with the respective risk weighted equivalent terms for
cost of capital δ# 
i 
and the (reciprocal of) regulatory ratio, γ Req 
# , and actual capital ratios, γ # : 
πB,t = 
∑ (
r i,t − δ# i 
)
. L i,t −
∑ 
s i,t . ( L i,t ) . L i,t −
(
μ′ . log 
(
1 
γ # 
i 
− 1 
γ # req 
))
. L Tot,t . (37) 
Here, actual leverage as given by risk weighted asset to equity is: 
1 
γ # 
= 1 
E t−1 
w BF . L BF,t + w HH . L HH,t + w SME . L SME,t 
= w BF . L BF,t + w HH . L HH,t + w SME . L SME,t 
E t−1 
. 
We denote, w BF < w HH < w SME : risk weights for loans to BFs, mortgages, and loans to SMEs, respectively; E : bank equity
capital; δ# 
i 
= σ # . w i . E t−1 L Tot ,t −1 : the cost of equity capital per £1 of lending to class i agents; σ
# : the cost of equity capital
estimated by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM); γ Req 
# : the required equity to risk weighted assets ratio; γ # :
the actual equity to risk weighted assets ratio; ϻ: is a positive parameter. 
As in Scenario II, banks attempt to maintain equity to risk weighted assets ratio very close to 10%. Therefore, the be-
haviour of a bank in any period t depends on the value of its equity to risk weighted assets ( γ t # ). Again, each bank will
determine its total lending to ensure that 8% <γ t # < 10%, which we will denote generically as L Tot,t 
# to cover the range of
values this can take. 
The first order conditions with respect to mortgages and loans to SMEs show that, in addition to the relative yields and
credit risk, the total amount available for mortgages and loans to SMEs, the risk weights and bank equity have a significant
impact on the optimal allocation between the two types of loans: 
L ∗∗∗HH,t = 
(
E t−1 . 
(
1 
γ # req 
−
(
w BF . L BF,t−1 + w SME . ( L Tot,t −L BF,t ) 
E t−1 
)
+ 
(
L Tot,t .μ. ( w HH −w SME ) 
E t−1 . ( ( r HH,t −δ# HH,t −s HH,t ) −( r SME,t −δ# SME,t −s SME,t ) ) 
)))
w HH − w SME 
(38) 
L ∗∗∗SME,t = 
(
E t−1 . 
(
1 
γ # req 
−
(
w BF . L BF,t−1 + w HH . ( L Tot,t −L BF,t ) 
E t−1 
)
+ 
(
L Tot,t .μ. ( w SME −w HH ) 
E t−1 . ( ( r SME,t −δ# SME,t −s SME,t ) −( r HH,t −δ# HH,t −s HH,t ) ) 
)))
w SME − w HH 
(39) 
In Eqs. (38) and (39) for the optimal loan allocations for mortgages and SMES, the first term in numerator gives the
extent to which the required risk weighted leverage defined in (37) deviates from the actual risk weighted leverage in
terms of lending at t-1 for bank loans and the risk weighted allocation to the other loan class in terms of the slack in totalPlease cite this article as: M. Fatouh, S. Markose and S. Giansante, The impact of quantitative easing on UK bank lending: 
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loans after exogenous BF loan determination at t . The second term in the numerators of (38) and (39) are operative only
if the indicator function in (27) μ = 1, viz. the bank is not capital constrained by the Basel II capital adequacy requirement.
The difference in rates of return between the two competing loan classes adjusted for their respective cost of capital and
default risks feature in the denominator of the second terms in (38) and (39) . 
Eqs. (40) & (41) indicate that a fall in loans to BFs ( L BF ) will induce banks to categorically increase mortgages, and to
decrease loans to SMEs as per the following comparative statics: 
ρ∗∗∗HH = 
∂ L HH 
∂ L BF 
= − ( w BF − w SME ) 
w HH − w SME 
< 0 (40)
ρ∗∗∗SME = 
∂ L SME 
∂ L BF 
= − ( w BF − w HH ) 
w SME − w HH 
> 0 . (41)
Thus, unlike Scenarios I and II, in Scenario III, as seen in Eq. (41) , as the comparative static term ρSME multiples the term
representing the slack in total bank lending that is brought about by the portfolio rebalancing by BFs away from bank loans,
with  L BF, t < 0, this will not lead to any increase in SME lending as the differences in the administratively set risk weights
given in (41) that are biased against SMEs, will militate against this. Eq. (41) gives the, ceteris paribus, rule of thumb that as
loans to big firms are reduced,  L BF, t < 0, given the size of regulatory weights below, this yields a 60% reduction to SME
loans for every £1 reduction in loans to big firms. In contrast, the risk weights favouring mortgages in (40) , result in 1.6
times expansion of mortgage loans for every £1 reduction in loans to big firms, subject to capital constraints. 
In fact, in Case C (see Scenario II) when banks are under capitalized with γ t-1 # < 8% , SMEs will now lose loan share as
follows: 
L ∗∗∗SME ,t = −
1 
w SME 
. 
(
RW A t−1 − 1 
0 . 08 
E t−1 
)
+ ρ∗∗∗SME . ( L BF ,t ) < 0 . (42)
This is due to the first term in brackets in (42) being positive by definition of γ t-1 # < 8% , 
28 and the second term is also
negative from (41) when  L BF, t < 0 . This is the negative double whammy that SMEs face in being frozen out of loans due
to the bias in the Basel II weights against them, especially, when a bank is capital constrained. 
The risk weights used in the model for different loan types are taken from BIPRU 3.4 Risk weights under the standardised
approach to credit risk available Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The value of these risk weights are as follows with w BF
being the weights on corporate loans, w HH those on mortgages and w SME the 100% weights on loans to SMEs : 
Source: BIPRU 3.4 Risk weights under the standardised approach to credit risk ; Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); Avail-
able at: https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/BIPRU/3/4.html#D591 . 
3.3.4. SMEs behaviour 
Like BFs, SMEs have a constant but lower annual operating profit to total assets ratio of 5%, and keep the size of physical
capital fixed over the simulation period. The main characteristic of SMEs is that they cannot control their debt financing (like
BFs) since the single source of this financing is bank loans. The latter depend solely on banks’ willingness to grant loans or
extend/renew current credit facilities to these firms. Additionally, the model assumes that SMEs have unlimited demand for
debt financing and that they cannot raise further external equity financing during the simulation period. As shown above in
Scenario III, the Basel II/III risk weight, which are biased against SMEs loans imply that they cannot enjoy any increase in
loans especially in the period of APP when BFs start to replace bank loans with bonds. This situation is more drastic when
banks suffer capital inadequacy as shown in (42) . Consequently, the components of a SME balance sheet in a given period t
are as follows, respectively, for the physical capital of SME, SMEPhC i, t , and SME operating profits, SMEOPP i, t , which is set in
(44) at 5% of physical capital 29 and SMEC i, t , the cash holdings of SME i in period t : 
SMEP h C i,t = SMEP h C i,t−1 (43)
SMEOP P i,t = 0 . 05 × ( SMEP h C i,t−1 + SME C i,t−1 ) . (44)28 Note as γ t-1 # = E t−1 RW A t−1 < 0.08 , rewriting this, we see that 
E t−1 
0 . 08 
< RW A t−1 . 
29 In contrast to the 10% return on gross fixed capital for big firm PNFCs, see footnote 21 , we are justified in halving this return for SMEs as only 
about 60% of SMEs post a profit during market downturns as in the APP period, see https://www.statista.com/statistics/291377/small- and- medium- 
enterprises- sme- wholesale- retail- profitability- uk/ . 
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Fig. 5. Initial Values (Q4 2008/Q1 2009) and Average Values (In Brackets) of Interest Rates and Default/Credit Risk Premia (Annual). 
1 BoE’s policy rate. (Source: Bank of England ( http://www.bankofengland.co.uk )); 2 Yield (%) on medium term 10-year gilts in December 2008 with aver- 
age yield over the period denoted by r G 
# = 2.79% (Source: https://dmo.gov.uk/data/ExportReport?reportCode=D4H ); 3 Interest rate on mortgages: Sterling 
weighted average interest rate on loans secured on dwellings (CFMB168) in BoE interactive website, Feb 2009; 4 Interest rate on BF loans: Sterling weighted 
average interest rate on PNFC loans (CFMB162) in BoE interactive website Feb 2009. 5 Data on write offs from BoE website, see Appendix Fig. A.1 . 6,7 Spec- 
ulative grade global bond default rate for 2009 : S&P Global Ratings Table 1 with the value in brackets being the average for the period excluding initial 
date 30 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In (45) , SMEC i, t , the cash holdings of SME i in period t is given as the cash holdings in t-1, its operating profits in t, less
the interest on SME bank loans at t-1, SMEB L i,t−1 , and the bank determined change in the amount of bank loans granted to
SME i in period t, SMEBL i, t : 
SME C i,t = SME C i,t−1 + SMEOP P i,t − r SME,t SMEB L i,t−1 + SMEB L i,t , (45) 
SMEB L i,t = SMEB L i,t−1 + SMEB L i,t , (46) 
SME E i,t = SMEP h C i,t + SME C i,t − SMEB L i,t . (47) 
In Eq. (47) , the net worth or equity of the SME, SMEE i, t , is given as the value of its physical capital, the SME cash deposits
less the value of its bank loans. 
4. Initial ACE model conditions and simulation results 
4.1. ACE model initial Conditions, policy rates and risk premia 
Section 3.1 outlined the data driven agent characteristics for the UK economy and the Appendix has given additional
details and the data sources for this. Fig. A3 in the Appendix gives the initial conditions and the balance sheet data for
the agents as set out in Sections 3.2 -3.4. The only remaining variables that need to be discussed are the price variables.
The policy rates and lowering of bond yields triggered by APP are for the most part considered to exogenous to agents’
behaviour. 
The ACE model includes 6 different interest rates and 3 proxies for credit risk/default rates on the 3 classes of bank
loans (needed for the variables s i,t (L i,t ), i = { BF, HH, SME }) and the default rate on corporate bonds. The initial values and the
average values over the period from 2009 – Q1 2015 (given in brackets) are presented in Fig. 5 above. The average values in
brackets give a better indication of how the impact of QE changes, in particular, the gilt yields and how the different loan
categories fair in terms of default risk over the period. First, the risk-free rate (r RF ) and gilts rate are set to the actual levels
of BoE policy rate (0.5%) and 10-year gilts rate (3.35%) just before the launch of APP in 2009 with the mortgage rates and the
corporate bond rates, respectively, tracking this over time. It should be noted that while the policy interest rate remained at
0.5%, the 10 year gilt yields fell to under 2% in May 2012, remained there till May 2013 and never rising above 3% thereafter.
Likewise, despite the very high bond default rates in 2009, Fig. 5 column (2) , with the bond default rates falling over this
period along with the fall in gilt yields bringing on average the cost of bond issuance to around 5%. The impetus for issuance
of bonds follows as the interest rate of bank loans to big firms increases to over 7.6%. With Fig. 5 showing that the initial
interest rates on PNFC bank loans was lower than the cost of corporate bond issuance underscores the fact that in the
immediate pre APP period of 2009, corporate bonds represented only 32.7% of nonfinancial corporations’ total debt. 
Further, premia on different types of bank loans are given to reflect the credit risk or default probability of the loans and
the cost of capital for banks. The credit risks denoted by s i,t (L i,t ) , i = i = { BF, HH, SME } are proxied by the UK bank write off30 This can be found at https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/774196/2016+Annual+Global+Corporate+Default+Study+And+Rating+Transitions.pdf/ 
2ddcf9dd- 3b82- 4151- 9dab- 8e3fc70a7035 . 
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Fig. 6. a The proportion of successful mortgage applications (Monthly) – Average of 50 Simulations for each Scenario. b Monthly mortgage approval rates 
(Averaged over 50 simulations for each of the Scenarios). 
Notes: Scenario 1 : No Capital Requirements; Scenario 2: Simple 8% −10% Basel I capital requirements; Scenario 3: Complex Basel II/III risk weighted capital 
requirements 
∗ Statistically significant P-values at 95% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rates for each class of loans. As seen in Appendix Fig. A1 , the initial values of default risk as proxied by the quarterly write
off rates is 0.31% for mortgages (annual rate 12.6%), 0.2.6% for SMEs (annual rate 10.3%) and 0.18% (annual rate 3.6%) for BFs.
However, on average over time, SMEs have a higher write off rate and as shown in Fig. 5 . Hence, in Fig. 5 , loans to SMEs
are given the highest initial interest rate of 8.8%, followed by 6.06% for mortgages and 5.3% for loans to BFs. 
4.2. Simulation results 
As stated earlier, the model in this paper covers a period of 50 months from the start of APP in 2009 and it involves
the micro simulations of the interaction between different agents and the responses of these agents to the developments in
debt markets. At any given month t , asset purchases under APP lead to an exogenous fall in gilts yield which is reflected
in the yield of corporate bonds through the portfolio rebalancing effect. BFs start to change their debt financing structure
when the cost of bonds becomes lower than bank loans cost. Meanwhile, each household receives its income, finances its
consumption, pays its mortgage instalment, and accumulates the rest into its cash holdings. 
The first set of results that are pertinent are the monthly rates of mortgage approvals under the 3 bank capital regime
scenarios given in Fig. 6 a. These results are averaged over 50 simulations for each scenario and for ease of perusal the
outputs of the 3 scenarios are given in one graph, Fig. 6 a, with Fig. 6 b giving the upper and lower bounds for the sample
mean values at 95% confidence level. These are found to be statistically significant at 5%. The charts on mortgage approvals
for the 3 scenarios with 95% confidence bands are given in Appendix Fig. A4 . These results hold the key to the systematic
bias in bank lending in favour of mortgages in the Basel II/III risk weighted regime of Scenario 3. 
While all 3 scenarios show a downward trend in mortgage approvals, Scenario 3 dominates in terms of the sample mean
of 3.75% of monthly mortgage approval rates as shown in Fig. 6 b. Following the time series in Fig. 6 a, this is the case
especially after 2010. Scenario 1 comes a close second with approval rates at 3.5%, driven as it is by the relative credit risks
given in the estimates proxied by bank write offs on mortgages which fall considerably by the end of 2009 while SME write
offs increased (see Appendix Fig. A1 ). Scenario 2 shows a considerable lower average in terms of monthly mortgage approval
rates of 2.85% as it has the least scope to respond to capital adequacy constraints with no risk weights that favour a switch
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Fig. 7. Actual UK Bank lending aggregates. 
Source: Bank of England’s Bankstats ( http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/bankstats/default.aspx ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We will now analyse the results in terms of the aggregate lending, with the breakdown for mortgages, loans to BFs, and
loans to SMEs for the 3 scenarios given in Figs. 8, 10 and 11 respectively. To make them comparable to actual data given in
Fig. 7 , the amounts of mortgages, loans to BFs, and loans to SMEs have been rescaled up using the proportions between the
actual and the hypothetical numbers of the agents in the ACE model. The main exogenous operative factor is that BFs do
not change their debt structure during the first 20 periods till the APP impact on bond yields bite and the cost of security
debt is still bigger than the cost of bank borrowing. The actual data in Fig. 7 shows how the total bank loans for the classes
of loans under consideration starts at about £1.6 trillion in 2009, achieves a relative peak in March 2010 at £1.81 trillion,
which, after a severe crunch then trends downwards to £1.75 trillion in March 2013, marking a fall of about £60bn from the
peak. The breakdown shows that only mortgages grew from £0.860 trillion in March 2010 to about £1 trillion in 2013, about
a £140bn increase. Other loans types, respectively, fell over this period from £0.60 trillion to £0.45 trillion for BFs (£150bn
fall) and from £0.20 trillion to £0.15 trillion for SMEs (£50bn fall). 
The main results here is as expected, only the extant Basel II/III Scenario 3, Fig. 8 , corresponds closely with the actual
data and produces the result that only the mortgage lending picks up somewhat while bank lending to the real economy
falls. Thus, the simulated results given in Fig. 8 show a very close correspondence with the actual data though the 2013
March total lending is somewhat smaller at £1.55 trillion as opposed to about £1.72 trillion in actual data in Fig. 7 . As
the key assumption in our framework is that the impact of QE manifests first in the portfolio rebalancing behaviour by
BFs in favour of bond issuance, the following Fig. 9 summarizes this result with the follow through implications of the
assumption that a BF one for one substitutes away from bank loans as it changes its bond to total debt ratio. This then
causes the rebalancing in bank portfolios in terms of mortgages and SME loans under the 3 scenarios. Fig. 9 shows how
the ACE simulation based on the BF behavioural rule in Section 3.3.2 Eq. (15) for bond issuance results in larger absolute
increases of bond issuance of £87.92 billion over the period from the start of APP (March 2009) to April 2013 compared
to the £6 8.4 8 billion actual increase on PNFC bonds based on data in Fig. 2 . However, the simulated results imply a less
aggressive increase of 9.9% in the BF bonds to total debt ratio than the actual increase of 15.7% over the relevant period.
This is due to the assumption in Eq. (16) that simulated bank loans to BFs starting at about £604 billion are reduced one-
for-one with the funds generated by bond issues. Corresponding to the comparative static Eq. (41) rule of thumb of a 60%
of the fall in loans to big firms,  L BF, t < 0, in Scenario 3, SMEs suffer a fall in loans from £0.20 trillion in 2009 to £0.147
trillion in 2013, about £52.1billion. This is somewhat larger than the actual fall of £50 bn in SME loans in this period. Finally,
in the case of Scenario 3, from Figs. 8 and 9 we see that simulated mortgage lending starts at about £0.81 trillion in 2009,
shows the similar peak as with the actual data in July 2010 of about £1.0 trillion, falls somewhat to recover to over £1.1
trillion in May-September of 2012 and then falls to £0.92 trillion in March 2013. This implies an overall cumulative increase
of £110 bn of mortgage loans in the simulated case. As in the actual data, the increase in mortgage lending fails to overcomePlease cite this article as: M. Fatouh, S. Markose and S. Giansante, The impact of quantitative easing on UK bank lending: 
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Fig. 8. Simulated bank lending aggregates £millions (complex capital requirements; risk weights) Scenario 3 (see Section 3.3.3.3 ). 
Fig. 9. Summary of key simulated results on big firm bond issuance, mortgage loans and loans to SMEs Under the 3 Scenarios (Scen 1–3). 
1 Actual data for Big Firm Bond Issuance is given from the same source in Fig. 2 (Data code CPMB29M from the BOE interactive website); 2 Cumulated 
between dates shown; 3 Note given the assumptions in Section 3.3.2 Eq. (15) , and the initial value of loans to big firms of about £604 bn, this category of 
loans fall at the same rate as bond issuance. Hence in the given period, the ACE model will register the same £88 bn reduction in loans to big firms which 
corresponds to the value of bonds issued (simulated). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the fall in loans to big firms and to SMEs. Recall that banks loans to big firms in the ACE model falls by the same amount
as the size of bond issuance of about £87.92 bn. Hence, these results support our hypothesis as to how banks will respond
to the conditions of APP when operating under Basel II/III risk weights. 
Fig. 9 shows a systematic bias against SME lending in Scenario 3, which operates in an iron clad way resulting in loan
reductions throughout this period when compared to SME loans under the other 2 scenarios, which continue to be positive.
It is important to note that while our result is not inconsistent with the studies of Thakor (1996) , and Heid, Porath and Stolz
(2004) results, in that banks suffering from capital inadequacy will look to improve their capital status by shifting out of
high risk weighted loans/assets, the ACE model here builds a more detailed set conditions of APP that triggered a series of
events which reduced both BF loans and loans to SMEs. SMEs suffered disproportionately only due to their unfavorable BaseIPlease cite this article as: M. Fatouh, S. Markose and S. Giansante, The impact of quantitative easing on UK bank lending: 
Why banks do not lend to businesses? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019. 
02.023 
20 M. Fatouh, S. Markose and S. Giansante / Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: JEBO [m3Gsc; March 16, 2019;3:10 ] 
Fig. 10. Simulated bank lending aggregates (simple capital requirements; no risk weights). 
Scenario 2 (see Section 3.3.3.2 ). Average of 50 simulation runs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I/lII risk weights. As the results from the other 2 scenarios show, there was nothing in the economic credit risk conditions
surrounding SMEs that this should have been the case. 
Thus, in contrast to the simulated outputs from Scenario 3, the other 2 scenarios do not show a fall in lending to SMEs.
In the case of Scenario 2, Fig. 10 , SMEs enjoy about the same level of loans around £0.1 Trillion and in fact this increases
to about £0.12 Trillion in 2013 March. It is expected that as Basel I unweighted 8% capital implies identical leverage of 12.5
for all asset classes, this could reduce total lending compared with Scenario 3. Hence, total lending in 2009 was £1.3 trillion
below the actual data of £1.6 Trillion, while in March 2013, Scenario 2 shows about the same level of total lending as in the
case of the simulated Scenario 3 at £1.5 trillion. But what is interesting in Scenario 2 is that with a lack of bias, the growth
in mortgage lending from £0.78 trillion in March 2009 to around £0.95 trillion in March 2013, a cumulatively increase of
£94bn (see, Fig. 10 ), is not at the expense of loans to SMEs. Loans to SMEs hold firm and also increase about £16.8 bn. 
Finally, there is a counterintuitive result regarding Scenario 1, Fig. 11 , which shows the lowest amount of total lending
at about £1.1 trillion in 2009 and £1.2 trillion in 2013 March. The idea that the absence of an explicit regulatory capital
rule need not lead to excessive lending runs contrary to what is often assumed. Indeed, as long as the banks are guided
by the optimal rule based on the relative credit risk proxies given in Section 3.2.3.1, there is clearly no threat of excessive
lending. Also, the lack of bias against SME lending means that this category of lending remains stable at about £0.15 Trillion
throughout the conditions of APP in Scenario 1 and in fact increases by about £14 bn over this period, Fig. 11 . Mortgage
loans also increase from £770bn in March 2009 to about £820bn in March 2013. 
4.3. Model validation 
Several validation methods have been used to validate simulated models in engineering in computer sciences. For in-
stance, Sargent (2013) outlines 17 techniques that can be used to validate simulation models. These techniques use logical
reasoning, quantitative methods, or visual representation to verify the soundness of simulated models. One of these tech-
niques, historical data (or empirical) validation , is recommended by Windrum et al. (2007) to assess models in the context of
ACME. In their history-friendly approach , a good model is one that can generate several stylized facts observed in the actual
data. To validate the model of this paper, this section examines the degree to which simulated lending aggregates represent
actual lending aggregates. To do that, two sets of regressions are run for the Scenario 3 simulated results. The R 2 results,
given in Figs. 12 and 13 of Scenario 3, which corresponds with the regime in situ, clearly outperformed the regressions
results of the other 2 scenarios (not reported). 
In the first test set, each of the time series of simulated and actual lending aggregates is regressed on time ( t ). This
can shed light on similarities on time trends between the actual and simulated data given by the slope coefficients (same
signs and/or statistical significance). The model specification for this test is L it = α + βt + εt , where L are loans to BFs, SMEs,
mortgages and total lending for the simulated and actual time series. Please cite this article as: M. Fatouh, S. Markose and S. Giansante, The impact of quantitative easing on UK bank lending: 
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Fig. 11. Simulated bank lending aggregates (no capital requirements) scenario 1 (see Section 3.3.3.1 ). Average of 50 simulation runs. 
Variable Coefficient on me Standard Error p value R2
Simulated BFs Loans 1.64 × 1010 1.51 × 109 0.00 0.7059
Actual BFs Loans 1.80 × 1010 1.68 × 109 0.00 0.7008
Simulated SMEs Loans 4.87 × 109 4.26 × 108 0.00 0.7269
Actual SMEs Loans 5.18 × 109 4.71 × 108 0.00 0.7122
Simulated Mortgages 2.93 × 1010 2.17 × 109 0.00 0.7879
Actual Mortgages 2.91 × 1010 2.04 × 109 0.00 0.8063
Simulated Total lending 5.06 × 1010 4.11 × 109 0.00 0.7557
Actual Total lending 5.23 × 1010 4.17 × 109 0.00 0.7574
Fig. 12. Summary of the simulated (Scenario3) and actual bank lending aggregates regressions on time. 
Fig. 13. Summary of the regression of actual on simulated bank lending aggregates. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12 shows very high similarities between simulated and actual coefficients on time for each loan class. The coefficients
on the simulated variables are statistically significant at a high 99% confidence level. 
The regressions in the second group investigate the correlation between simulated and actual data by regressing each
actual time series on the corresponding simulated one. The model specification for this test is L Actual it = α + βL Simulated it + εt ,
where L are loans to BFs, SMEs, mortgages and total lending. Please cite this article as: M. Fatouh, S. Markose and S. Giansante, The impact of quantitative easing on UK bank lending: 
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The coefficients on the simulated variables are statistically significant at a high 99% confidence level while R 2 values
in Fig. 13 reveal robust correlations between the actual and simulated bank lending aggregates. Similarly, the comparison
between the results of the regressions of each of the actual bank lending aggregates with the corresponding results for
simulated aggregates indicate that the simulated data is a very good representation of the actual data. But as discussed in
the outputs from the simulations, the response of agents to a regulatory system in place is far from satisfactory as it leads
to a systematic bias against loans to SMEs. 
5. Conclusion 
A standard textbook model of bank lending starts with the premise that banks’ primary objective is to lend to non-
financial firms. We set up a data driven agent based model (ABM) of the UK bank lending to households for mortgages
and to big firms and SMEs that reflects the reality on the ground that this is far from the case. In the context of QE and
APP launched by UK authorities in 2009, increasing bank lending was one of the main goals. Yet, ONS sectoral financial
accounts data shows that although bank lending to households for mortgages has been expanding since 2009, total bank
lending witnessed a noticeable drop driven by a decrease in lending to businesses, especially to SMEs. We explicitly take
the reduced bond yields in the course of APP for triggering a portfolio rebalancing by big firms in the direction of bond
issuance and a substitution away from bank loans as the main factor behind the demand side fall in bank loans from big
non-financial firms. We have shown that a data rich ACE model of the UK banking system, which is equipped with the Basel
II/ III regulatory bank capital constraints, is needed to demonstrate how the slack caused in the bank loan portfolios by big
firm substitution in favour of bonds post APP, helped expand UK loans for mortgages at the expense of loans to SMEs. As
noted by Goodhart and Ashworth (2012) , 31 this overall contraction in UK bank lending, especially to SMEs, while mentioned
in the many papers on the impact of APP that use event studies and econometric models, they have failed to give a cogent
explanation. 
In the spirit of Stiglitz (2011) and Jones (20 0 0) , we focus on the incentives and constraints posed by the Basel capital
adequacy rules on the UK banking system. The ACE model was developed to investigate the conditions created by APP
and QE in the UK primarily on bank supply side responses for lending to households for mortgages and to SMEs, which
unlike big firms do not have access to the bond market. We have raised the important question whether regulatory capital
requirements should penalize sectors like SMEs when clearly the credit risk conditions do not warrant this. Indeed, the
complex Basel II/III risk weighted framework has been implicated for causing perverse incentives and destabilizing capital
arbitrage that exploits the risk weights both in the run up to 2007 GFC, Markose et al. (2012) and in the case of the Eurozone
crisis, Acharya and Steffan (2015) . 
Following the recent BoE agent based model of the UK mortgage market, Baptista et al. (2016) , our data driven ACE
model anchors the mortgage eligibility conditions for UK households in empirical data on their income distribution, extant
home owner status and net worth after mortgage indebtedness. Likewise, the relevant financial balance sheet data of other
agent classes are used as initial conditions. An important empirical scale factor is used to determine the proportions of the
agents in the different classes to simulate the UK economy and to produce simulation outputs that are similar in value
to actual macro-economic data. As we saw this has worked. Likewise, to focus on how the key bank lending decisions
operate, we recommend that ACE models should embrace the embedding of an endogenous section within a framework of
the wider economic data which is fed exogenously to the agents as they make their decisions at each time step within the
simulator. This is a new ingredient to ACE modelling that can produce quantitative outputs that are of similar magnitudes
as actual variables and produce finely tuned institutionally rich simulations for policy analysis. Finally, we think that there
is some urgency to develop an extension to the extant ACE model to give more details for the behaviour of US and UK
companies, which have been given the impetus by APP to issue bonds. These funds have been used to pay back bank loans
and to pursue what many regard to be an excessive strategy of share buy backs that can contribute to stock market bubbles,
corporate indebtedness and slow growth. 
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Appendix A. Empirical evidence on the UK economy 
The UK economy data around the launch of APP in 2009 is used as empirical base for the ACE model. The Appendix
includes relevant data that was used in the ACE model for the nonfinancial sectors (households and nonfinancial businesses)and banks in the UK that has not been discussed in Section 3. 
Fig. A1. Quarterly loan write-offs (%) by UK banks by loan type. 
Note: The probability of default is proxied by the ratio of loan write-offs to the total amount of loans for each loan type. The amounts of loan write-offs 
and total mortgages and business loans to BFs and SMEs are available from BoE. 32 Total PNFCs (i.e. PFs + SMEs): loans (LPMB4VR), write offs (RPQTFHB). 
SMEs: loans (RPMZ8YH), write offs (RPQTFHK). 
Source: Bank of England ( http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/newintermed.asp ). 
Fig. A2. Top 10 UK banks equity to total assets ratios. 
Source: Bankscope Database available at ( http://www.bvdinfo.com ). 
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Fig. A3. The initial values/distributions of the model’s variables. 
Please cite this article as: M. Fatouh, S. Markose and S. Giansante, The impact of quantitative easing on UK bank lending: 
Why banks do not lend to businesses? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019. 
02.023 
M. Fatouh, S. Markose and S. Giansante / Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization xxx (xxxx) xxx 25 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: JEBO [m3Gsc; March 16, 2019;3:10 ] 
Fig. A4. 95% Confidence interval bands for mortgage approval rates given in Fig. 6 b. 
a. Scenario 1 b. Scenario 2 c. Scenario 3. 
Note: Shaded area represents 95% confidence interval based on 50 simulations. 
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